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Abstract—The National Science Foundation (NSF) will be exper-
imenting with a new distributed approach to reviewing proposals,
whereby a group of principal investigators (PIs) or proposers in a
subfield act as reviewers for the proposals submitted by the same
set of PIs. To encourage honesty, PIs chances for getting funded
are tied to the quality of their reviews (with respect to the reviews
provided by the entire group), in addition to the quality of their
proposals. Intuitively, this approach can more fairly distribute the
review workload, discourage frivolous proposal submission, and
encourage high quality reviews. On the other hand, this method
has already raised concerns about the integrity of the process
and the possibility of strategic manipulation. In this paper, we
take a closer look at three specific issues in an attempt to gain
a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of the
new process beyond first impressions and anecdotal evidence. We
start by considering the benefits and drawbacks of bundling the
quality of PIs reviews with the scientific merit of their proposals.
We then consider the issue of collusion and favoritism. Finally, we
examine whether the new process puts controversial proposals at
a disadvantage. We conclude that some benefits of using review
quality as an incentive mechanism may outweigh its drawbacks.
On the other hand, even a coalition of two PIs can cause significant
harm to the process, as the built-in incentives are not strong
enough to deter collusion. While we also confirm the common
suspicion that the process is skewed toward non-controversial
proposals, the more unexpected finding is that among equally
controversial proposals, those of lower quality get a leg up through
this process. Thus the process not only favors non-controversial
proposals, but in some sense, mediocrity. We also discuss possible
ways to improve this review process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Science Foundation (NSF) makes its funding
decisions primarily by using a standard panel review process,
whereby a panel of experts are invited to review a set of
proposals, discuss their merits at a round table, and make
panel/summary assessments and recommendations. However,
the steadily increasing number of submitted proposals to NSF
is putting significant stress on this process: A larger number
of proposals increases the workload, and a higher workload
generally degrades the quality of reviews. More importantly,
the increasing number of proposals in any given field implies
a shrinking pool of qualified reviewers in that field as they
can no longer contribute to the review process due to conflict
of interest considerations; this again leads to concerns that the
quality of reviews may degrade.
This has led the NSF to contemplate alternative peer-review
systems, and set out to experiment with a distributed approach
to peer-review, detailed in [1]. This review process is adapted
from the mechanism proposed by Merrifield and Saari in [2],
with the main goal to fairly distribute review workload among
the proposers themselves1, and increase the quality of the
review process. The pilot test is planned for the proposals
submitted to the Signal and Sensing Systems (SSS) program
by the October 1, 2013 deadline. Briefly, this distributed review
process proceeds as follows: initially, all submitted propos-
als are sorted based on their specific subfields, resulting in
groups of 25-40 proposals. After collecting conflict of interest
information for a group, the main PI for each proposal in a
group is required to act as a reviewer for seven of the non-
conflicting proposals in his/her group. PIs are given 30 days to
complete written reviews, as well as a relative ranking of the
proposals in their pile. The partial rankings of the proposals
are then compiled into an initial global ranked list. As failure
to complete the review task removes a PI’s proposal from
further consideration, submission of a proposal to this program
implies an agreement on the applicants’ part to participate in the
subsequent review process. In addition, an incentive mechanism
is put in place to ensure honest and thorough reviews, whereby
the PIs are awarded additional points based on the quality
of their reviews judged by how other PIs have rated similar
proposals. The initial global ordering is then modified by
directly including each PI’s bonus points in the assessment of
his/her proposal. The program directors make the final decision
to award/decline funding based on the modified ranking (see
Section II for more details).
Despite its benefits, especially in terms of distributing the
burden of review, the authors in [2], as well as the academic
community, see e.g., [3], [4], [5], have expressed concerns
about the robustness of this approach. Firstly, as the proposed
review process is based on a mechanism design approach,
1The terms proposers, applicants, participants and PIs will be used inter-
changeably.
2without an in-depth study in the corresponding framework, it
is not clear whether the inclusion of bonus points provides
enough incentive to make truth-telling the (stable) equilibrium
of the induced game. Without such a study, this process may
seem “unprincipled” [5] and the claims of it being based on
mechanism design are deemed “overblown” [3]. Secondly, the
best reviewers are not necessarily the best researchers and
vice versa [4]. Therefore, there is the rather philosophical
issue of whether bundling the quality of PIs’ reviews with the
scientific merit of their proposals will result in discrimination
against applicants who are less experienced in the field or
less competent reviewers. Thirdly, while the use of a complex
mechanism may help to deter applicants from gaming the
outcome, complexity also make it harder for the designers to
detect manipulation [3].
Furthermore, even though the issue of collusion and fa-
voritism is present in many forms of peer-review processes,
including the NSF panel-review system, the new approach may
present new loopholes and opportunities for exploitation. For
one, the reviews are performed anonymously, providing more
protection to colluding parties (note that [1] not only prevents a
PI from finding out who reviewed his/her proposal, as it should,
but with the current specifications, seems to shield reviewers
of the same proposal from each other, which is contrary to
current practice). On the other hand, the set of reviewers in
each subfield is more or less predictable, in the extreme case
leading to a “hostile takeover of an areas’ funding” [3], where
a sufficiently large group of applicants target the same subfield
to mutually promote their proposals.
Last but not least, there is the question of whether this pro-
cedure will drive all the involved parties (proposers, reviewers,
and the funding system) towards favoring non-controversial
proposals. To begin, controversial and high risk proposals are
likely to receive mixed reviews. This may ultimately cause them
to rank low on average, which then leads the funding system to
favor less controversial proposals. More importantly, as a result
of using review quality bonuses, reviewers are discouraged
from supporting high-risk proposals if they believe this does
not reflect the group consensus [2], [3], [4], [5]. This problem,
which is considered the greatest potential concern by Merrifield
and Saari [2], not only drives the reviewers to support less
risky proposals, but in turn leads to proposers submitting more
conservative proposals.
With these concerns in mind, we set out to examine three
specific aspects in the present paper. We first analyze the
effects of bundling a proposer’s performance as a reviewer
with the scientific merit of his/her proposal. As such quality
bonuses are intended as an incentive mechanism, we start by
analyzing their effectiveness in preventing certain forms of
dishonest behavior. We compare these positive effects with the
two negative effects of discrimination and loss of accuracy
induced by their inclusion. Our findings present an overall
positive argument in support of such an incentive mechanism,
as the downsides appear minor compared to the benefits. We
then switch focus to the commonly studied issue of collusion,
and show that the integrity of a fully decentralized mechanism
is quite vulnerable, as the quality bonuses fail to deter even the
simplest coalitions.
Finally, we examine the issue of controversial and high-
risk proposals. Note that rewarding PIs with quality bonuses
based on their consistency with others results in a Keynesian
beauty contest [3], [4], [6], whereby reviewers strive to conform
to the public opinion. Therefore, the first concern regarding
controversial proposals, also discussed more frequently in [2],
[3], [4], [5], is whether the proposed review process discourages
applicants from expressing their honest assessments due to
fear of losing quality bonuses. In Section VII, we discuss
modifications to the mechanism that could prevent such incli-
nations. We also present a different, perhaps more surprising,
aspect of the mechanism when dealing with controversy, only
briefly mentioned in [3], [4]. We show that even if reviewers
express their honest opinions, the inconsistency among them
puts controversial proposals at a disadvantage. Yet the most
unexpected and subtle, is the finding that even among equally
controversial proposals (but with different quality averaged over
mixed reviews), those of lower quality are given an unfair
advantage. Thus the bias toward mediocrity occurs at multiple
levels. 2
Our study employs a mixture of analysis and simulation. The
initial discussion in each section is based on simulation, while
a tractable utility function introduced in Section III facilitates
analysis for additional insight. It should also be mentioned that
this study looks at the merits of the new review system on its
own; it is not meant as a comparison with the current panel
system. For instance, we do not account for the possibility that
the quality of participants as reviewers may improve over the
current system, partly the rationale behind the new system [1].
We end this section with two important notes. As part of the
research community we very much welcome such an effort by
the NSF and the idea of a new and possibly improved review
system, echoing a sentiment expressed in [3], [4], [5]. Thus the
ultimate goal of this study is to obtain a better understanding
of the strengths and limitations of the new approach, so that
improvements may be constructed. Also worth noting is the fact
that though this paper focuses specifically on this new review
process, the analysis and conclusions also apply to certain social
networking problems, see more discussion in Section VII.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Details of the
new review process is presented in Section II, followed by a
model for the proposers’ utility in Section III. We examine the
pros and cons of bundling review quality with proposal quality,
the process’ vulnerability to manipulation by coalitions, and its
handling of controversial or risky proposals in Sections IV,
V, and VI, respectively. Section VII concludes the paper with
suggestions for improvement.
2Reviewers’ tendency towards favoring non-controversial proposals is what
is referred to as favoring mediocrity or conservative mediocrity in [2], [3], [4],
[5]. Our findings confirm this effect, but also highlight the tendency to favor
the lower quality among the controversial proposals. Therefore, in this paper,
“favoring mediocrity” will refer to the latter observation.
3II. THE NSF REVIEW PILOT: A DISTRIBUTED PROCESS
The NSF pilot review process [1] is based on the distributed
review mechanism proposed by Merrifield and Saari in [2], with
a few minor modifications. The basic idea is to relegate the
task of proposal review to proposers themselves, while taking
precautions to deter them from slacking or gaming the process
in their own favor. A detailed description follows.
A. Assignment Process
Upon submission of proposals to the SSS program, the
program directors group the proposals based on their specific
subfields. Each such subfield, referred to as a group, consists
of N PIs/proposals, with N typically between 25-40 proposals.
Each PI is then tasked with reviewing m proposals in his/her
group, with which he/she has no personal or organizational
conflict of interest (CoI). The PIs are given the list of all PIs in
their group and are required to declare CoI prior to the review
assignment process.
Each proposal is likewise assigned to m of its permissible
reviewers. Therefore, a total of Nm reviews are collected
in each group. The number m is chosen carefully, with the
following considerations: (1) it should be small enough to
impose a reasonable workload on the reviewers, (2) it should
be large enough to discourage the submission of (multiple) low
quality proposals, and (3) it should be large enough to extract
a reliable overall ranking of the N proposals from the partial
rankings (discussed in more detail shortly). Accordingly, [1]
proposes a choice of m = 7. The assignment of proposals to
reviewers is done at random, subject to different levels of CoI
constrains among the reviewers.
B. Calculating an Initial Global Ranking
Each PI is required to provide a written review for each
of the m proposals in his/her pile, and to rank the proposals
in this set against each other. The ranking should be based
on how the reviewer thinks the group will rank the pile, and
not on the PIs personal preferences/interests. The goal is to
arrive at an objective representation of the communities’ view
rather than aggregating personal preferences3. Proposals receive
Borda scores [7] of 0 to m − 1 in accordance with their
position in the PI’s ranked list, with the highest ranked proposal
receiving m−1 points. A proposal’s total score is the sum of the
m Borda scores assigned to it. Total scores are then normalized
into the [0, 1] range by dividing by m(m−1). This normalized
score is referred to as the Modified Borda Count (MBC) of a
proposal. The initial global ordered list is compiled by ranking
proposals based on their MBC. Figure 1 verifies that even with
the choice of a moderate m, this initial global ranking is a good
representation of the intrinsic merit of the proposals, so that the
top proposals are selected with high accuracy. The results are
averages over 105 random proposal assignments.
3This specification in the mechanism, coupled with the quality bonuses
detailed in the next subsection, is in fact a main source of concern. Even though
these guidelines are intended to encourage honest assessments, they inevitably
result in a Keynesian beauty contest, in which reviewers benefit from second
guessing one another. See Sections I and VI for a discussion.
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Fig. 1. Effect of m on the global list obtained from the partial rankings.
C. Rewarding the Quality of Reviews
In order to incentivize PIs to invest time and effort in
the review process, and in hopes of deterring manipulation,
including defamation and promotion, the proposed review
process rewards PIs in accordance with the quality of their
reviews. Specifically, a PI’s honesty and effort are assessed by
comparing his/her proposed ranking with how others have rated
similar proposals, using the following absolute deviation from
the global ranking as a measure of the quality of PIi’s reviews:
Qi =
m∑
j=1
|rank of jin i’s list −
rank of j among
these m in global list|. (1)
The reward to user i is determined by Bi = 2aQmax−QiQmax .
Here, a := MBCmax−MBCminN is the average difference in
MBC between adjacently ranked proposals, and Qmax is the
worst quality measure possible when i’s proposed ranking is
exactly the reverse of the global ranking. Consequently, if a PI’s
submitted ranking is perfectly aligned with the global ranking
(Q = 0), he/she expects a maximum increase of 2 positions in
the final ranked list.
We would like to point out one of the differences between
[1]’s adaption of the mechanism proposed in [2]. In [1], quality
bonuses are used for determining rewards, but not to weed out
incompetent or malicious reviewers. The authors in [2] however
consider such possibility. The latter assumption could result in
higher accuracy of the final ranking list, especially if there are
irrational, incompetent, or arbitrarily malicious participants.
The final ranking of all N proposals is based on the initial
global list, modified with the rewards B, so that each PIi’s
final score is determined by rˆi = MBCi + Bi. Awards are
then given to the top T proposals (say top 15% [3]) based on
the final sorted rˆ list.
III. A UTILITY MODEL AND MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
Our study of the distributed review process is based on a
mixture of analysis and simulations. We will use the “proba-
bility of getting funded” as the main metric in all our illustrative
numerical experiments. This metric, however, is not amenable
to analysis. Therefore, we also introduce the following tractable
utility function, which captures important aspects of the real
scenario.
4Consider a group consisting of N PIs, each submitting one
proposal. Without loss of generality, assume that proposals are
indexed by their intrinsic merit/quality (assumed to exist), with
higher indices corresponding to better proposals. Let rˆi denote
the final score of PIi, ∀i = 1, . . . , N . We propose the following
model for PIi’s utility:
ui =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
rˆi − rˆj
|i− j|p
, (2)
where p > 0 is a constant. Firstly, we note that the proposed
utility function is increasing in rˆi, reflecting PIi’s interest in
having a higher score than all his/her peers. Secondly, due
to the nature of the review process, PIi is more interested in
standing out among his/her closest competitors. To illustrate,
consider the following example: if PI21 can somehow make
himself/herself look better in comparison to PI22, say by low-
ering rˆ22 and increasing rˆ5 instead, he/she will be increasing
his/her chances of getting funded. This is because the lower
quality proposal poses a smaller threat to PI21. The term in the
denominator of the utility function serves this purpose.
We would like to note that there are indeed many other
possibilities for a utility function. Nevertheless, some tractable
choices such as ui = rˆi, ui = rˆi/(
∑N
j=1 rˆj), or ui =∑N
j=1(rˆi − rˆj), despite satisfying the first requirement, fail to
capture the latter effect mentioned above. On the other hand,
the functions that would capture both effects to varying degrees,
e.g. ui =
∑N
j=1 sign(i−j)|rˆi−rˆj |p with 0 < p < 1, or (ideally)
ui = Prob (proposal i is in the top T ), are much harder to
analyze, as finding the full probability distribution of rˆ is a
significant challenge, whereas an analysis based on (2) only
requires the expected value of the final scores.
We make the following assumptions throughout the paper.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume PIs are equally capable, and
have the ability to accurately assess the m proposals in their pile
and assign Borda scores according to the proposals’ intrinsic
merit. A notable exception to this assumption is in Section
IV, when we examine how a PI with a high quality proposal
but low review quality may be disadvantaged. Furthermore, we
assume reviewers exert their highest level of effort (note that
this does not necessarily entail perfect accuracy), and ignore the
associated costs. Finally, to simplify both the simulation as well
as the analysis that follows, we assume there is no CoI except
that obviously nobody reviews their own proposal. Therefore,
we assume assignments follow a uniform probability distribu-
tion. We denote by Ri the set of PI/proposal i’s reviewers, and
by Ai the set of proposals assigned to PIi.
IV. BUNDLING REVIEW AND PROPOSAL QUALITIES
The new review proposes incentivizes honest and thorough
reviews by incorporating review quality in a proposal’s overall
assessment. Accordingly, the PIs whose reviews are in sync
with other PIs’ opinions, are rewarded by having their proposal
moved up in the ranked list. Despite the possible drawbacks
(see Section I), bundling review and proposal qualities can
be beneficial to the review process, as the reward mechanism
may be effective in preventing dishonest behavior and unjust
reviewing by punishing participants whose opinions are drasti-
cally different from others. More importantly, the mechanism
is leveraging the commodity of interest [8] to incentivize PIs’
honest cooperation. The main advantage of this approach in
contrast to using a numeraire commodity (such as taxation), is
that it eliminates the need to know the participants’ valuation
of commodities other than those being allocated (in our case
the funding decision). In the current setting, it is reasonable to
assume all PIs are interested in getting their proposals funded,
whereas their valuation of other commodities such as monetary
charges, future privileges or restrictions, and the like, may be
difficult or impossible to evaluate. Below we study the pros and
cons of this approach.
A. Bonuses Can Deter Dishonest Behavior
We start with an upside of bundling review and proposal
qualities, and show how including quality bonuses prevents
certain PIs from an otherwise profitable deviation from honest
reporting of reviews. We will focus on one specific form of
dishonest behavior, referred to as “evil” deviations in [2]. An
“evil” deviator, henceforth simply referred to as a dishonest PI,
reverses his/her submitted ranking to bring down the highest
ranked proposals, hoping to increase the chances of getting
his/her own proposal funded. Intuitively, this deviation is prof-
itable for PIs of relatively high quality proposals, as slandering
other high quality rivals will move them up in the ranking.
Before proceeding with our discussion, it should be noted
that our analysis in this section is not intended to verify
that truth-telling is an equilibrium of the game induced by
the proposed review mechanism, which is a very interesting
subject of future research. There could indeed be other forms
of dishonest reporting that would lower competitors’ standing
while still securing some bonus for the deviator. Our goal
in presenting this specific form of dishonest behavior is to
highlight the benefits of including quality bonus as part of the
final score, at the very least as a means of preventing a plausible
type of deviation.
1) Illustrative numerical results: Set N = 25, m = 7, an
acceptance rate of 15%, and PI21 as the dishonest PI. Figure 2
shows the probability of each proposal getting funded, averaged
over 105 random runs with the initial proposal assignment
being the random factor. Note that the dishonest PI is chosen
to be the one whose own proposal is just on the borderline
of being funded. As also seen in our subsequent results and
quite to be expected, the PIs with proposals on the acceptance
borderline are more prominently affected by any manipulation
of the mechanism or its inherent deficiency. This is because
smaller changes in the final scores can change the eventual
outcome for these proposals. Therefore, we will often observe
a “reversal of fortune” at the borderline. As shown in Fig. 2,
without bonuses, PI21 can increase his/her chances of being in
the top 15% by being dishonest. However, with quality bonuses,
a dishonest PI no longer benefits from reverse ranking, since
due to loss of bonuses, he/she will fall behind competitors.
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No Bonuses − All Honest
No Bonuses − 21 Dishonest
w Bonuses − All Honest
w Bonuses − 21 Dishonest
Fig. 2. Probability of a proposal getting funded vs intrinsic merit
2) Analysis: An analysis based on the proposed utility model
(2) is consistent with the above observation. If all users j
assess and report the Borda scores of their respective sets
Aj accurately and honestly, the probability that a proposal i
receives a Borda score of k from a random reviewer j is given
by:
P (j
k
→ i) =
(
m−1
k
)(
N−m
i−k−1
)
(
N−1
i−1
) .
Thus, the expected MBC of a proposal i is given by:
E[MBChonesti ] =
1
m(m−1)
∑
j∈Ri
m−1∑
k=0
k · P (j
k
→ i) =
i− 1
N − 1
.
Therefore, if all reports are truthful, PIi’s utility will be:
E[uTi ] =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
E[rˆi]− E[rˆj ]
|i − j|p
=
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
i−1
N−1 −
j−1
N−1 + E[Bi −Bj ]
|i− j|p
= 1N−1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
i− j
|i− j|p
. (3)
We now focus on the effect of reverse ranking. It can be
similarly shown that if there are e dishonest PIs in Ri reporting
a reversed ranking, the expected MBC of the target i is:
E[MBC e dishonesti ] = (1−
e
m
)
i− 1
N − 1
+
e
m
N − i
N − 1
.
Assume PIi is the only dishonest reviewer reporting reversed
Borda scores on Ai. If the quality bonuses are not included in
the mechanism, a dishonest PIi’s utility will be given by:
E[uEi ] =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
i−1
N−1 − (
j−1
N−1 +
2
(N−1)2 (
N+1
2 − j))
|i− j|p
= 1N−1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
i− j
|i− j|p
+ 2(N−1)2
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
N+1
2 − j
|i− j|p
= E[uTi ] +
2
(N − 1)2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
N+1
2 − j
|i− j|p
. (4)
The second term in (4) quantifies the gains/losses from dishon-
est behavior. It is easy to see that this terms is positive for higher
i indices, and negative for lower indexed PIs, verifying that
reverse reporting is only a profitable deviation for higher quality
PIs. Intuitively, degrading other high ranked PIs increases the
chances of a good quality proposal for getting funded, as it
will look better in comparison with close competitors. Reverse
ranking by low quality PIs on the other hand will give more
points to their other low ranked rivals, making them look even
lower in comparison. In practice, a reviewer cannot necessarily
predict where his/her own proposal stands in the global ranking.
In this case it may be argued that he/she has little to lose to
adopt the reverse ranking, for the proposal gains if it happens
to be in the top pile while it really does not matter if it is in the
bottom pile as there is not much hope even without the reverse
reporting.
Next, we assume bonuses are awarded based on the quality of
reviews. Ideally, when PIs are reporting truthfully they expect
a 2N bonus added to their initial MBC
4
, while a dishonest PI
expects a zero bonus. However, a reversed report by PIi may
result in inaccuracies in the final ranking, in turn making honest
PIs lose bonus points. Assume rather pessimistically that PIi
can alter the final ranking enough to make all honest PIs appear
as only moderately accurate reviewers, resulting in a difference
in bonus of 1N
5
. PIi’s utility will now be given by:
E[u
E/B
i ] =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
i−1
N−1−(
j−1
N−1+
2
(N−1)2
(N+12 −j))−
1
N
|i−j|p
= E[uTi ] +
1
(N−1)2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
3− 1N − 2j
|i− j|p
. (5)
The second term in (5) is negative for all i. Therefore, once
quality bonuses are awarded, reverse ranking will no longer be
a profitable deviation.
B. Side Effects of Including Quality Bonuses
We now turn to two possible downsides of this approach.
Firstly, a main premise for justifying the use of quality bonus
is that all reviewers are equally competent and accurate when
evaluating a proposal. This is however not necessarily true,
as the best researchers are not necessarily the best reviewers,
and vice versa. To illustrate, set N = 25, m = 7, and an
acceptance rate of 15%. Consider PI23, an applicant with a high
quality proposal, whose evaluations are affected by a Normally
distributed noise of known variance, with a higher variance
reflecting a lower level of competentency (recall the review
efficiency is determined by how similar PI23’s reviews are to
the others’). We assume every other PI does a perfect job in
ranking the proposals assigned to them. Figure 3 shows the
changes in the probability each proposal gets funded if PI23
performs less accurately. As shown in Fig. 3, when bonuses are
4In practice PIs may get less than 2
N
bonus even when they are all truthful,
depending on the outcome of the assignment process, see Section IV-B.
5Based on simulations, honest PIs’ loss in quality bonuses is much smaller.
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No Bonuses − 23 Weak
No Bonuses − 23 Weaker
w Bonuses − 23 Weak
w Bonuses − 23 Weaker
Fig. 3. Less competent reviewers have a lower chance of getting funded.
added, the chance of PI23 getting funded decreases as his/her
inaccuracy increases. Thus much as expected, those that are less
experienced in reviewing will be placed at a disadvantage6.
Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, even if all review-
ers are equally capable, accurate, and honest, the addition of
quality bonus puts higher quality proposals at a disadvantage.
To better explain this phenomenon, consider the following
counterexample: let N = 25, m = 7, and a 15% funding ratio.
Consider two PIs/proposals, i = 22 who should get funded,
and j = 21 who is right on the borderline. Now assume the
outcome of the proposal assignment process is rather skewed,
in the following sense: an average quality proposal, say 15,
happens to fall into multiple batchs of low quality proposals,
e.g. Rk = {3, 8, . . . , 15}. Due to the structure of Borda scoring,
reviewers are required to assign a score of 6 to the best proposal
in their pile regardless of its intrinsic merit. Therefore, the
skewed assignment could very well lead to a high global rank
for proposal 15. Now assume i is assigned a more uniform
set of proposals, say Ri = {3, . . . , 15, . . . , 23}, and assigns
the Borda scores 0, . . . , 6 to these proposals. It is easy to see
that i will get a low quality bonus based on such ranking,
even though he/she has been honest and accurate. If another PI,
say PIj has a better quality bonus, he/she may end up getting
funded instead of PIi. This observation is reflected in Fig. 4,
which shows the change in the probability each proposal is
funded after the inclusion of quality bonuses, averaged over
105 random proposal assignments. Figure 4 refutes the claim
in [1] that: “. . . if all reviewers do an excellent job of ranking
the proposals they review, all PIs’ proposals will be moved up
equally, which means that the ranking will not be changed . . .”.
Also, following a similar argument, this situation is exacerbated
when all PIs’ reviews are affected by a Normally distributed
noise, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
It should be noted that PI22 has a higher probability of
being funded than PI21, with or without the inclusion of quality
bonus, as shown in Fig. 5. That said, the addition of bonus
does make higher quality proposals’ outcome more sensitive to
perturbations to the system, e.g., the funding ratio.
C. A Comparison
We now compare the quality bonuses’ merit in preventing
6On the up side, quality bonuses can lead to higher quality reviews by
incentivizing those who have the expertise to exert high effort, thereby
improving the quality of the review process.
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Change in Probability (in %) of Being Funded 
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Proposal/Reviewer Index
 
 
No Error
Normal − σ = 2.5
Normal − σ = 5
Fig. 4. Higher quality proposals are at a disadvantage.
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Fig. 5. Higher quality proposals still have a higher chance of getting funded.
certain malicious intent (e.g., submitting reversed ranking) and
its side effects shown above. This is illustrated in Fig. 6, where
N = 25, m = 7, acceptance rate is 15%, PI21 is dishonest, and
all PIs are equally accurate. Numerically, based on Fig. 6, the
dishonest PI can alter his/her chances of getting funded by as
much as 30% when quality bonuses are not used (the largest
jump in Fig. 6), whereas once quality bonuses are included, PI21
expects a ∼ 8% lower chance of being funded if dishonest,
and is thus deterred from dishonest reporting. On the other
hand, the inclusion of quality bonuses would only result in an
inaccuracy of ∼ 4% in the probabilities of getting funded (the
smaller bump at index 21, see also Fig. 4).
Comparing these positive and negative effects, we conclude
that direct inclusion of quality bonuses in the assessment of
proposals may very well benefit the review process. Never-
theless, it is worthwhile to look into incentive methods that
use either review quality bonuses or alternative metrics as a
numeraire commodity (rather than the commodity of interest).
See Section VII for a discussion.
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Fig. 6. Dishonest ranking does more damage than quality bonuses.
7V. COLLUSION
We now move on to the issue of collusion and personal fa-
vors. Unlike the issue of quality bonuses which is specific to the
proposed process, collusion can arise in many review systems,
including the traditional panel based reviews. However, certain
features of the new review process may make collusion easier
to conduct and harder to detect. The first is the fact that under
the new process a reviewer/PI gets to see the entire list of
other reviewers/PIs in the same group (in order to declare CoI)
so it may be easier for someone to determine whether there
are opportunities of collusion, whereas in the current panel
system reviewers may not find out the identity of the other
reviewers until they arrive at the panel. Secondly, since the
reviewers are also PIs, there is the opportunity for direct and
instantaneous quid pro quo between two (or more) PIs if the
assignment happens to match them up such that they review
each other’s proposals; by contrast, in the current system the
reviewers and PIs are two disjoint sets, thus a favor done (by a
reviewer to a PI) cannot be repaid until much later, if ever, and
very likely through a different channel as the PI receiving the
favor cannot guarantee to later serve on a panel that includes the
reviewer’s proposal. Last but not least, under the new process
the reviewers appear to enjoy a higher level of anonymity which
may provide more protection to colluding parties and makes it
harder to detect7.
In this section, we focus on the case where there are only
two PIs colluding, PIi and PIj. We consider two possible
arrangements between colluding PIs. With One-Sided favors,
only PIi is favoring the other, in case they are matched, as
follows: he/she assigns the highest Borda score m−1 to PIj, and
then assigns reverse Borda scores of m−2 to 0 to the remaining
proposals, with 0 points for the highest ranked proposal. This
means PIj is always benefiting from the collusion (with an
increased expected score and slandered rivals), while PIi may
be putting itself at risk (for receiving a low quality bonus).
Therefore, one-sided favors reflect a PI’s gains with the help
of a single ally without the need for immediate payback. The
second type of arrangement is Reciprocal favors: PIs both plan
to favor one another in case they are matched, but with a more
conservative collusion strategy: if matched they assign m−1 to
their ally, and then truthfully assign Borda scores of 0 to m−2
to the remaining proposals. Thus, the two PIs are expecting
both gains and losses from such an arrangement.
A. Illustrative Numerical Results
For the following simulation, we fix N = 25, m = 7 and an
acceptance rate of 15%. Furthermore, we focus on the colluding
parties who have a low chance of getting funded, i.e., those
with intrinsic merit of 21 or lower. To see whether collusion is
profitable, we look at the changes in probability of a proposal
getting funded, with or without collusion. We further consider
7It must to be mentioned that such anonymity also protects honest but
different opinions, whereas the current panel system may allow some opinion
to trump others.
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Fig. 10. Reciprocal Favors - high
quality proposals
the two cases where a relatively high quality proposal teams
up with either a high or a low quality proposal.
In what follows, the first two cases correspond to one-
sided favors, and consider the changes in probability of getting
funded assuming PIi is one of PIj’s reviewers. This event itself
occurs with probability m/Nj , where Nj < N is the number of
PIs with whom j does not have CoI. When N or Nj are small,
PIj is more likely to be matched with an ally. For reciprocal
favors, we consider the a priori probabilities of getting funded,
i.e., the PIs do not know whether they will end up being the
other’s reviewer.
Case I: One-Sided Favors - High/Low. Assume PIi submits
a low quality proposal, which has a low (or zero) chance of
getting funded. Thus PIi has nothing to lose, be it with or
without the quality bonus. In this case, the one-sided favors
to PIj will increase the latter’s chance of getting funded at the
expense of lowering the chance of higher quality proposals,
as shown in Fig. 7. An agreement between a high and a low
quality proposals’ PIs is a plausible scenario, in that applicants
could actually arrange to have a low quality proposal submitted
for the sole purpose of having a chance to promote a main
proposal. Furthermore, the PI for a low quality proposal who
has little prospect of being funded may be more open to such
arrangement in return for future favors.
Case II: One-Sided Favors - High/High. Assume PIi submits
a proposal that is likely to get funded. However, by promoting
PIj’s proposal, PIi is putting him/herself at risk of getting a
lower score due to loss in quality bonus. As shown in Fig.
8, this loss may be negligible. In fact, PI18 decreases his/her
chances of getting funded by roughly 0.3% while increasing
PI20’s chances by close to 30%.
Case III: Reciprocal Favors - High/Low. PIj, the PI for a
high quality proposal, can further increase his/her chance of
getting funded with reciprocal favors, but the gain is consid-
erably lower than from Case I, since he/she is losing quality
bonuses by promoting a low quality proposal, shown in Fig. 9.
Case IV: Reciprocal Favors - High/High. Finally, PIs with
already relatively high quality proposals can collude to gain as
8shown in Fig. 10. This means that the loss in quality bonus is
not severe enough compared to the advantage gained from the
collusion.8
Despite the benefits of quality bonuses discussed in Section
IV-A, results here motivate the need for either an alternative
incentive mechanism, or additional control over the reviewer
assignment process, as the loss in quality bonus alone is inad-
equate to deter PIs from forming even the simplest coalitions.
B. Analysis
We close this section by presenting a brief analysis based
on the proposed utility model (2), to illustrate the gains from
colluding in one-sided favors from PIi to PIj.
When all PIs report truthfully, j’s utility is derived in the
same way as (2). With one-sided favors, when i ∈ Rj , the new
expected MBC of proposal j is given by:
E[MBCj ] =
j − 1
N − 1
+
N − j
m(N − 1)
.
The remaining proposals, if matched with reviewer i, expect
higher MBCs if they are of lower quality, but are downgraded
if they are of higher quality. Accordingly, the expected MBC
of a proposal with index k 6= i, j is given by:
E[MBCk] =
k − 1
N − 1
−
1
(N − 1)2
(k − 1−
m− 2
m− 1
(N − k)) .
Finally, the quality bonuses that proposals k 6= i, including
proposal j, receive are similarly affected by PIi’s altered report.
Therefore, we will assume E[Bj −Bk] = 0, ∀k 6= i, j.
Using the above expressions, the expected utility of PIj when
aided by PIi is given by:
E[uCj ] = E[u
T
j ] +
N − j
m(N − 1)
∑
k 6=j
1
|j − k|p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit from increased MBC
+
1
(N − 1)2
∑
k 6=j,i
k − 1− m−2m−1 (N − k)
|j − k|p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit from decreased MBC of rivals
. (6)
As shown in (6), the benefit from colluding with PIi is two-
fold: it improves one’s standing while possibly decreasing the
chances of higher quality rivals.
As observed earlier, PIi himself/herself may not be immedi-
ately benefiting from one-sided favors. This is mainly because
PIi is losing quality bonuses. In addition, this PI may be further
set back by reverse reporting, as he/she may end up promoting
his/her low quality rivals. These effects are also observable
8If even higher quality proposals collude, say PI22 and PI23, they would both
benefit but less than PI20 did when colluding. Numerically, the probability of
getting funded for PI22 and PI23 increases about 1% and 0.5% respectively,
PI24 and PI20 are each down about 0.2%, and PI21 is down about 1%.
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using the utility function (2):
E[uCi ] = E[u
T
i ] +
1
(N − 1)2
∑
k 6=j,i
k − 1− m−2m−1 (N − k)
|i− k|p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of reverse reporting
−
N − j
m(N − 1)|i− j|p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to j’s increased MBC
−
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
E[Bi−Bk]
|i−k|p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss in quality bonus
. (7)
VI. CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSALS
Considering the significance of consistency between PIs’
reviews in the proposed distributed review process, we devote
this section to the subject of how the nature of the inaccuracy
of reviewers and the disagreement among them on the more
controversial proposals can affect the outcome of the review
process, even when reviewers are somehow instructed to ex-
press their honest, yet differing viewpoints.
To this end, we consider two classes of proposals, see Fig.
11. Non-controversial proposals are those for which reviewers’
evaluations follow a Normal distribution, reflecting some noise
in reviewers’ assessments. In contrast, controversial proposals
follow a bi-modal distribution, modeling a possible disagree-
ment on the intrinsic merit of the proposal.
Specifically, consider a group of N proposals indexed by
their intrinsic merit. In general, each reviewer is able to evaluate
a proposal subject to some error, such that reviewer i evaluates
proposal j as rij = j + bij . Reviewer i then sorts the
proposals in Ai based on rij and assigns Borda scores of 0
to m − 1 accordingly. We assume only one of the proposals,
k, is controversial, so that for each i ∈ Rk , bik ∼ N (µik, σ2),
µik is either +δµ or −δµ with equal probability. The remaining
proposals j 6= k are non-controversial, with bij ∼ N (0, σ2).
For the following simulations, we set σ = 2.5 and δµ = 5.
A choice of σ = 2.5 means that reviewers are able to evaluate
a proposal within 5 places of its intrinsic merit with high
probability. The first natural expectation is that controversial
proposals are likely to be at a disadvantage compared to their
non-controversial close rivals due to their set of mixed reviews.
This is verified in Fig. 12, where a controversial proposal of
intrinsic merit 23 looks worse than its true value. Nevertheless,
our results show that this speculation is only half true –
controversy appears to actually help intrinsically lower quality
proposal, but hurt intrinsically high-quality proposals, as shown
in Fig. 13. To understand this, consider a proposal of merit 17,
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which would not be normally funded. By receiving positive
reviews from some reviewers, this proposal will overall get a
leg up in the ranking. A high quality proposal with true merit
23 on the other hand has a lower chance of getting funded
when it is controversial. This is because higher ratings are not
likely to change the MBC of this proposal, as such proposal
should already stand out against other competitors in the pile.
Low ratings (due to the controversy) on the other hand can
bring down the MBC of this proposal, putting it at an overall
disadvantage. Consequently, this review process will not only
tend to disfavor controversial proposals, much as expected,
but also tend to favor mediocrity among equally controversial
proposals.
Finally, note that the reviewers of controversial proposals
are also at a disadvantage. These reviewers will receive lower
quality bonuses as a result of disagreeing with one another,
and are set back by the reviewers lucky enough not to have
been handed any controversial proposals, as the latter are more
likely to be in sync with the global view, and thus receive high
quality bonuses.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have focused on three specific aspects of the new NSF
SSS program review pilot procedure, and highlighted some of
its strengths and limitations.
On the first concern of whether the quality of reviews should
be part of the proposals’ final assessment, as its benefits in
preventing dishonest behavior are more considerable than the
possible losses, we conclude that the use of quality bonuses as a
commodity of interest is a viable option. Though discrimination
against less competent reviewers is inevitable, some of the
inaccuracies induced by the use of quality bonus may be alle-
viated as follows. As pointed out in Section IV, despite being
honest, accurate, and competent, some PIs may receive lower
bonuses depending on the outcome of the review assignment
process. This effect can be avoided by assigning a more or
less uniformly distributed set of proposals to each reviewer,
either using a pre-processing round, two rounds of reviews, or
by increasing m, the number of proposals assigned to each
reviewer [5]. This latter solution will increase the accuracy of
the review process, while reducing this side effect of including
quality bonuses, see Fig. 14, though obviously it also increases
the burden on the participants.
Alternatively, both drawbacks could be avoided by using the
quality of reviews as a numeraire commodity. For instance,
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imposing limits on future submissions and decreasing the work-
load of future review assignments, are two extreme examples of
negative and positive numeraire bonuses, respectively. However,
as the valuation of these commodities is often difficult to assess,
their implementation will be more challenging.
The issue of collusion may be ameliorated by collecting, a
priori, CoI lists, i.e., before exposing the list of PIs in a group,
or, by limiting the review assignments to those such that no
two PIs are directly matched (reviewing each other’s proposal).
Also, a final round of reviews of the higher ranked proposals
by a panel of experts could help weed out proposals that have
been unjustly promoted.
Dealing with controversial proposals may be more chal-
lenging, as the inclination of the review system towards non-
controversial proposals is the result of multiple factors, in-
cluding the nature of Borda scoring, and the applicants’ and
reviewers’ disinterest in high-risk proposals. A possible solution
would be to explicitly encourage innovative proposals through
the initial call for proposals and review guidelines [2], [4], as is
done currently. In addition, it is possible to detect controversial
proposals based on their diverse set of reviews. As the number
of these proposals is often small, it might be reasonable to
suggest further discussion by the set of reviewers, or adding a
separate round of reviews, either by a different group of PIs,
or by a panel of expert reviewers. Also, adding a comment
phase before voting, in which reviewers can share (anonymized)
comments with the other reviewers, may bring attention to
innovative proposals [5]. Finally, by enlarging the message
space, reviewers can be given an additional entry to specifically
present their views about high risk proposals [4].
Lastly, we note that in addition to scientific journals and
funding committees, the distributed mechanism can be appli-
cable in other peer-review settings, e.g. medical peer-reviews,
where the built-in incentives could lessen concerns of sham
peer-reviews [9]. Furthermore, a similar approach can be im-
plemented in elicitation and peer-prediction problems, which
are used to aggregate users’ predictions about a given event
[10]. A main assumption in many of the existing mechanisms
is that users do not attach any value to the outcome the elicitor
is building using the aggregated data. The proposed method
could prove especially useful if this assumption fails to hold,
e.g. when aggregating reputation-related data from a group of
competitors.
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